REFLECTIONS ON THE CAMPAIGN TO

DISRUPT LAND FORCES

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WHAT WAS LAND FORCES?

Land Forces 2024 was a **massive weapons sales event/expo** that took place on unceded Wurundjeri lands, Naarm, in September 2024. Generals, weapons CEOs, diplomats and defence ministers came to do deals that end in Genocide.

Some top-notch death merchants were there like Elbit, Lockheed, Boeing, Hanwha, Thales and NIOA. They were **showcasing their latest tech and making billion-dollar contracts.**

ORGANISER AMDA FOUNDATION LIMITED

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This exhibition had happened in 2021 and 2022 in Megandin, Brisbane, was heavily opposed by the community, and was naively moved to Naarm. **The campaign to disrupt Land Forces was a cross-movement collaboration** with more than 50 community groups and organisations and it saw some major wins, however it also provided **insight into the state of the movement and some valuable lessons to learn.**

This zine aims to summarise important aspects of the campaign, as well as lessons to learn for the future.

HOW WAS THIS ZINE DEVELOPED?

Following DLF, a series of publicly-advertised evaluation sessions took place in person and online. A group of POC core organisers of the campaign had conversations that lead us to release this specific report. Notes from the overall evaluation sessions as well as reflections of all the organisers were then combined in a draft, which was sent to multiple trusted comrades and organisations that played a significant role in the campaign for feedback and input.

All quotes have been drawn from verbal and written feedback offered during DLF evaluation sessions. We acknowledge that the perspectives of notetakers, writers and editors are an active presence throughout this work.

The following document is not intended to provide a complete or comprehensive overview of the campaign, but rather to shine a light on some of the more significant learnings and observations from multiple POC and newer organisers. A complete 30+ page report of the campaign written by Wage Peace is published on the website and can be accessed through disruptlandforces.com.au, however we do not believe it covers our perspectives.

PRINCIPLES+PROCESSES

The 'participants agreement' was very simple. Participants were asked to agree to two rules:

NO HARM TO LIFE

'Harm' was defined as physical harm that could result in life threatening injuries to humans and/or animals. This definition was an oversimplification of harm and in the future there should be an expansion and clarification of what this means.

RESPECT OTHER ACTIVISTS

'Respect' meant a deep commitment to non-judgemental, open-hearted interpersonal communications and interactions, along with all the usual caveats against bigotry or discrimination.

A detailed conflict resolution plan was formulated by multiple experienced activists, based on previous DLF campaigns. However, it was not actually applied in situations where conflict did arise, nor was it shared with attendees and collaborators in the leadup for input.

In future, we believe that more attention and time should be given to establishing a clear conflict resolution process decided through consensus or voting (if consensus is not possible), and it should be made public to all activists entering the space.

OTHER PRINCIPLES INCLUDED:

Ask, don't tell. Approach with curiousity not judgement.

Say yes. It's an experiment. Say yes to new things. Try stuff out.

No police. Don't police each other's tactics, messaging or appearance. Don't repress each other.

Solidarity rules. Whatever divergences exist between us, we stay united as fuck. We don't talk to cops, air our grievances in public or spill our secrets to the press.

A major critique of these principles is that they were **not developed with consensus** and were borrowed from previous DLF campaigns.

For example, we felt the "say yes" principle caused more harm than good. We need to be critical of the tactics used and how they shape the strategy of the campaign. What worked for a small group in a particular place may not work for different sizes and places.

The principle of "solidarity rules" was used at times to silence dissent in public and refuse to take accountability or answer questions from the community. We believe solidarity must include remaining open to feedback and criticisms

STATE REPRESSION & POLICING

Melbourne Activist Legal Support (MALS) published a comprehensive report titled "*The Policing of the DLF Protests*". This can be accessed through their website *mals.au.* We would absolutely recommend reading this report for an-depth analysis of police powers, tactics used and charges laid on activists.

Overall arrests numbers were around 110 during the mobilisation, alongside 40 to 50 home raids and arrests in the months following the mobilisation (recorded until Jan 2025).

QUICK SUMMARY

The Supreme Court of Victoria authorised the use of special powers under the **Terrorism Act.** The purpose of the Act is to expand powers and obligations relating to the prevention of and in response to terrorist acts, which does not include advocacy or protest in its definition.

We have never made any statements with intentions to cause serious physical harm to a person, so this was in effect put in place to silence dissent.

The increased police powers allowed them to stop and search a person, their possessions and their vehicles and direct them to leave without a warrant.

Needless to say, the police misused the power granted to them and used excessive force and weapons to squash dissent.

WINS OVERVIEW

Overall, it is safe to say that we were successful in achieving the main goals of the mobilisation:

The weapons dealers and their Expo were disrupted

Connected new crews and mobilised thousands of people

People's sense of power and connectedness held together in the face of repression and harm by the State

Frontline voices from different struggles around the world were centered, from Palestine, West Papua, Kanaky, Abya Yala, Western Sahara and many more

The passive community was disrupted and everyone learned what was happening in that building

Experiences of organising or participating in many new tactics

Closing down DFO and surrounding businesses was a significant disruption

Rapid development of knowledge, skills and capabilities for many new committed organisers

All mainstream and independent media, locally and internationally covered the disruption.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

The focus on one entrance and the frontline with police became one of the main focus, while most of the attendees had unimpeded access to other nearby doors to the convention. This symbolises a tendency for "barricade fever" - where all people feel they need to be at the barricade, instead of analysing the situation and acting accordingly to maximise disruption.

Even though the invitation to join the mobilisation should remain open to all orgs and groups, the main actions or events with potential to cause the maximum impact and or conflict should be held by the main organising collective rather than by an outside group.

This mobilisation was an X-ray of the movement, showcasing all our splits, cracks and differences.
We struggled to implement some of the principles, especially in high-pressure environments or where real time communication was impossible.
This shows the importance of taking time establishing processes well ahead of time and running through likely scenarios as well as having fall back plans.

STRUCTURE & COLLABORATION



DLF used a collaborative organisational structure where the invitation was open for everyone. The structure was developed to enable the cooperation of a large number of people in sets or groups. There was a main group chat on Telegram which people were directed to from social media, website and posters through QR code. This structure made sure that "leadership" was at the centre and not necessarily on top, however much of the power was still concentrated in the hands of a few organisers which only became clear when key organisers were affected by police repression before the mobilisation started.

Working groups were established during the first public meeting. Each working group functioned independently. People were encouraged to join one to three working groups, and have a representative in the Core Organsing Group (COG), which functioned well as a connecting space. However, there were a couple of already established chats that sometimes functioned as an organising space that were not explicitly disclosed to groups. This made decision-making vague at times and introduced power structures and hierarchy.

COLLABORATION WITH GROUPS

The outreach working group brainstormed a list of about 150 organisations and reached out to them to ask them to sign our open letter and nominate a representative to join the collaboration space on Signal. We had over 50 collectives and organisations who signed the pledge, including big groups such as APAN. However, this failed short of delivering measurable contributions, as around 90% of the groups who signed this did not in actuality organise an action or support in other ways.

ON VIOLENCE

HOW ACCUSTOMED ARE WE TO VIOLENCE IN OUR SPACES? AND WHAT DO WE CONSIDER TO BE "VIOLENCE"?

DLF reaffirmed that state and police violence are intensifying, not just on the streets but also through surveillance. The state will utilise violence as a first response to any group or organisation that threatens to challenge the status quo, not as a response to our actions.

In addition, the state continues to exercise violence towards the community, in particular towards First Nations, women and POC. This violence has been normalized to the point where throwing a tomato is seem more violent than imprisoning or kidnapping Indigenous children.

The images from the first day of DLF speak for themselves. Rubber bullets, tackling, OC spray, stun grenades and physical abuse are some of the tactics used to attempt to deter us from protesting.

This state violence brought the public's eye to Land Forces and made sure that everyone knew exactly what was going on in that building, and whose profit and benefits the police were really trying to protect.

THEIR STRATEGY WAS SIMPLE



They had spent months preparing for this mobilisation. They held press conferences to boast about everything they were putting in place to protect the public and exhibition attendees. They started to work the narrative that DLF is a radical leftist group who were intending to cause harm and violence, with the aim of isolating us politically from the wider public.

We believe we countered that narrative sucessfully with our collaboration structure that engaged the wider community and dozens of organisations, and it was proven by hours and hours of footage that showcased that it was the police who intended to cause harm from the get go.

The following is a quote from an activist during an evaluation session:

"Violent protesters give the public an easy out and ignore the key message without further thought … we simply do not have the public support or the numbers for this. I think violence and bin-burning comes from a place of hopelessness, but I think the problem with this violence is that it was too individualistic. I believe violence triggered the police to escalate and take the bridge."

It was extremely disappointing to hear feedback about "violence from protestors" during the DLF evaluation sessions. Those who criticise other protestors referred to "small incidents of poor activist behaviour, verbal abuse to suspected participants, the abuse of ordinary people on their way to work." They also quoted that "a handful of people using violence muddled up the objective". **These protesters are not "rogue", they do not act in isolation and they sure as hell do not muddle up our objective or image.**

Violence is perpetrated by police. It always has and it always will. Shouting at police or hassling people heading towards the exhibition is not violence. Property damage is not violence. Violence is the murder of innocent people, violence is manufacturing weapons for Genocide, violence is not holding those responsible to account.

We urgently need to talk about violence because the left in so-called 'australia' have become so complacent that we scarcely resemble revolutionaries anymore. And **we must kill the cop in our head before we attempt to ignite the flames of resistance in this colony,** because clearly people are not ready, they have reached their theoretical limits, and you can see how over the years, policing each other has brought us nowhere. So now is the time to ask ourselves, will we continue to place flowers on their guns and tanks?
Or is a new approach needed?

BLACK BLOC

Before DLF, resources were widely shared about the benefits of Black Bloc and how to achieve it, **especially in an action with heavy police surveillance**. The Black Bloc on the first morning was incredible - people kept each other safe. In fact the **large majority of people arrested after DLF were people not in bloc**, which proves its effectiveness. The concerns that those in bloc would face more police repression were unfounded as this did not occur.

Multiple stories emerged of people who don't like bloc tactics trying to stop individuals in the black bloc from taking autonomous action by physically intervening.
This should not be tolerated for two reasons:

1) do not put your hands on anyone without consent

2) it makes that individual more vulnerable to police repression

During the evaluation process, some concerns were raised regarding “the obsession with black bloc” and that it has gone too far. This shows a lack of understanding of new surveillance techniques in our communities.



Since DLF, VicPol and mainstream media outlets have released images of unmasked protesters, doxxing many and appealing to the public to snitch.

These images have helped VicPol identify, raid and arrest dozens of people (110 to date).

While there is no shame in being arrested for taking staunch action against the state, **the cost of arrests to both the individual and the movement is significant,** specially when simple Black Bloc techniques could have prevented it.

We do not agree with “taking pride in arrest”. This may be applicable for white privileged “citizens” who can afford trials and or will not face deportation or physical abuse. **For us POC activists, the cost / benefit of being arrested has a completely different weight and it should not be romantiziced.**

A final note on Bloc: it is a tactic, and like any tactic there are spaces where it works and times where it doesn't. This should be communicated in advance, and most importantly, we shouldn’t attack our comrades for using different tactics. We can talk it out and agree to disagree.

SALT

Socialist Alternative, or SAlt, are a contentious political organisation in so-called 'australia'. Their involvement with Disrupt Land Forces was minimal yet problematic, and it was done through Students for Palestine (S4P) - one of their front organisations.

Members of S4P attended the first public meeting and were invited to speak. This alienated some people straight away and we lost the support of an important organisation that refused on principle to share the space.

The main reason they were invited to speak at the first public meeting is that in July 2024, they called a picket and rally for the opening day of Land Forces, without any previous consultation of DLF team. They wheatpasted the city and distributed flyers to "claim the space", **one of their common co-opting tactics.**

A couple of members of SAlt were in the Collab space, but they did not communicate through the group chat. They kept their communication through one main DLF organiser and refused to engage with anyone else.

The SAlt question is ongoing and, as a movement, we must find a way to work around them because they are not going anywhere, their aggresive recruitment drive brings them to any and all events perceived as progressive.

In hindsight, we should have organised the first event separately and/or provided an alternative to their event instead of going along with it for fear of losing numbers they had already obtained. There has to be some level of communication and collaboration, and there needs to be transparency regarding who is in touch with them and what decisions are being made in private conversations.

SALT WERE PROBLEMATIC IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:

No collaboration on decision making, prior to and on the day of the first picket

Not engaging in discourse with groups or organisers who had differing views

Mobilising marshals who were not properly briefed and were aggressive towards people. Marshals were seen to yell at people, telling them to run in directions that placed them at higher risk, and did not consider people with disability and older folks.

Aggravating the police and attendees and then deciding to leave once police repression increased, leaving vulnerable people behind.

Splitting the crowd as they have done many times in the past, which meant the risk for remaining people was even more amplified. This was a problem for two reasons:

it created widespread confusion and poor communication

it created vulnerability due to lower numbers

Moreover, they ignored the advice given which specifically predicted the blockade of the main road and the dangers of a kettle police tactic.

THE "POD" IDEA

To work around excessive police repression and being kettled, people were encouraged to form groups of 10-15 people that move together in the space and mobilise at different points. PODs can be useful for people without an affinity group. As a concept, it is a brilliant idea and should be considered in future mobilisation where police repression is expected to be high.

It was not successful because:

- It was not explained properly
- People in smaller groups were kettled
- People tend to congregate together in high-pressure environments
- The time to get people in a pod was underestimated
- People followed the megaphone, and most of the megaphones were with marshals
- Months of organized rallies made people less autonomous

How to improve on PODs:

COMMUNICATION & RECOGNITION

For the pods to have a colour and flag, which could help facilitate greater recognition.

Pods should also be in communication with each other .

Caution needs to be exercised as the cops could use colours as an identifying feature.

UPSKILLING & THEORY

Upskilling sessions and forming pods PRIOR to the mobilisation, at least two weeks before.

Encourage people to stick to their pods and explain the rationale behind it.

Learn and practice how to split up the crowd as necessary and take different spaces.

OP SEC & ORGANISING ON SIGNAL

All organising was done on Signal for security. Some working groups such as the Medics decided to have a chat on Telegram, nothing was done on WhatsApp or any other messaging platforms.

There were **limitations of using Signal chats** as an organising methodology. Firstly, the lack of ability to have **groups within groups, to pin messages or to use threads** was inefficient. Also, by the nature of the app, it was **difficult to keep up with people's changing names** so a lot of time was spent trying to pin someone down. This can be mediated by **holding upskilling sessions in the leadup.**

The anonymity factor of Signal means that people could be **rude to each other without accountability.** Clear group chat etiquette and more admins would have prevented some of this.

It is important to note that security is compromised by organising over chats. Those who were arrested during the mobilisation may have had their phones compromised. Also, through raids that have happened since DLF, we know that signal chats can sometimes be retrieved through various means even if disappearing messages are on. These security weaknesses are always changing with OS updates and new surveillance technologies.

It's always best to do as much organising offline as possible - it is safer and helps better connect people. We also recommend discouraging people from bringing phones to actions.

PHYSICAL BASE OF OPERATIONS

We booked the Seafarers Mission as a base for the mobilisation. It was about 7 minutes walk from the MCEC. We had access to some storage facilities, a kitchen and a space to gather and upskill as well connect with other activists from across the continent.

This was an amazing space and well worth the money spent to book it. However, publicly announcing the location as the base made it vulnerable to harassment by police where some officers entered the building at various times and were hassling people. The publicity of the location also meant that media was appearing at the location without consent and attempted to film people during upskilling sessions or meetings.

"People running phones for legal support need a fully private room where they can see everyone who enters or exits the entire time. The room was really comfy but if I were a cop, very easy place to stash a listening device when unfamiliar people are coming and going constantly and leaving/picking up gear."

It is absolutely essential to have a base. However, it should not be publicly announced, and there should be people present there in shifts for lookouts and to warn others if police or media are present.

MARSHALLING

There is much debate in organising spaces about marshals. Early on in our organising we decided not to have marshals for events organised by the DLF collective. If we were to have marshals, we should have our own guidelines and training for "in-house" marshals instead of using pre-established groups. Some actions organised by other groups chose to have marshals, and that was effective in maintaining a perimeter and providing direction.

One of our core values is no policing each other. Marshalling could be considered to be conflicting with this principal. When collaborating with other groups, discussions have to take place until consensus is achieve in terms of expectations and consent, especially when it comes to body autonomy, being physically moved or yelled at or blocked.



'BE LIKE WATER'

In the leadup to DLF, there were memes on social media encouraging people to "be like water" - to be fluid and mobile.

This was because at recent direct actions such as the IMARC blockade, traditional blockade strategies of linking arms have left people vulnerable to police violence because they can't run away.

There was some feedback that the "water" strategy is not an improvement on traditional blockading methods as "It did not make us safer or more effective. It just meant that people got brutalised in a more atomised way."

We should explore this tactic further. While we had encouraged people to move in this way, what we realised on the ground that this was more effective in smaller actions such as pickets and blockades with 100-150 people. It is much more difficult to achieve in larger crowds unless PODs are properly organised.

MEDICS

From Naarm Frontline Medics (NFM):

DLF was really great for medics because we were involved from the very start, which meant that we were able to start planning and also be involved in conversations early on around safety and preparedness. We couldn't have been more prepared on the day even if we tried. It was good to see so many people promoting aftercare and assisting with decon, and to also have so many people sharing info about/attending the NFM organised decon/first aid training.

The Medics noted there was a second group of medics who were associated with {SAlt} who initially approached NFM about decon training but went elsewhere instead. We have reports of them treating people in ways that caused additional harm and problems. This included spraying saline on people's faces, which spreads the OC spray down the body, instead of wiping it away.

Other mistakes include spraying eyes without properly opening them, which also spreads the OC around the eyes and face. They also failed to remove casualties from the area where they were hit and to prevent further harm from taking place. NFM had to re-decon a number of people as a result of this, which makes the decon experience a lot more stressful and traumatic for the casualty.

We're not sure how these practices came to be adopted but we hope any feedback can be taken in good faith to create safer methods for the future. We encourage any and all to attend NFM training sessions that run through the year. Even as a protestor, having the training will help make us all safe.

MEDIA & MESSAGING

The media team included about 10 people who worked together for three months before the mobilisation, as well as about 12 spokespeople from frontline-affected communities who were trained in the weeks prior.

The media response was enormous. There was daily coverage from almost every major news corporation and multiple international reports. DLF captured the attention of the city, but also revealed that we never have control of the media narrative.

We live-streamed when we could, even in the midst of the violence, and our spokespeople were interviewed over and over, ultimately doxxed and relentlessly attacked by attempts to "trick" us into saying anything compromising or find that sensationalist headline.

Murdoch and mainstream media was heavily focused on police and protestor violence, largely blaming protestors for "breakdown of social cohesion", supporting an obvious agenda to facilitate stronger repressive laws in Victoria before the next election.

We must use this space in particular to thank the **amazing and comprehensive coverage by community radio 3CR and independant journalists**, as well as other independent activists and outlets that documented our protests. We also had our own Land Forces Satirical Ad and a fake reporter: Truthy McTruthy.

PROPAGANDA

As well as social media, there were dozens of poster designs and stickers distributed for wheatpasting and flyers at rallies. **The propaganda team was strong** and Sydney Road was repping hard! There was also A0 posters distributed across the city by donation from a local artist who fundraised 6k.

It would be worth evaluating the efficacy of these approaches considering the amount of effort and money they take as there was a lack of other tactics such as **stalls, stunts, letterboxing, gigs and social media paid ads** or collaborating with big accounts.



DISRUPT LAND FORCES!
STOP ARMING ISRAEL!
WEAPONS OUT OF NAARM NOW!
Sign-up at www.disruptlandforces.org
to join the mobilisation! 8-14 September

TRAINING

Multiple training sessions were organised in the lead up

Media spokesperson training

Legal briefing in collaboration with Melbourne Activist Legal Support (MALS),

Medics and first aid in collaboration with Naarm Frontline Medics

Media training in collaboration with Economic Media Centre,

Action prep & Bail Police liaison training

Possible future trainings:

Moving people from one space to another (i.e Theatre of the Oppressed)

Cooking for a large group of people

Opsec regarding digital devices and communication.

Practice runs as hostile interviews

Trainings and workshops are vital for community and for successful actions, yet are notoriously under-attended.

There needs to be more focus on advertising these sessions ahead of time and encouraging people to attend. It is also worth noting that certain training sessions were avoided for security reasons: anonymity, lack of vouching guidelines, and not secured online sessions.

ON TACTICS

A myriad of tactics was used throughout the campaign. **From open letters and stunts, to rallies and lock ons, to dress ups and throwing manure at cops.** It was an invaluable experience and mobilised thousands of people and brought a new edge to the movement.

Most of the creative ideas that were presented during the public meetings were not taken on as most of these ideas revolved around getting inside the building, which proved very difficult.

Some organisers said they were afraid to present ideas in group chats or meetings for fear of "being cancelled". This was especially true for younger activists, as well as those who wanted to organise colourful or creative things and felt stifled in their creativity due to security culture concerns. There has to be a safe space for people to organise and express their solidarity and fierce resistance in their own way, however activists need to **differentiate between being cancelled or simply comrades presenting valid critique.**

We still believe that a wide range of tactics by various groups and collectives is the most effective pathway to disrupting an expo or a business. Overall, there needs to be **more effort put into education and organising people into affinity groups months prior to the action**, and as in ongoing movement building exercise, for a true diversity of tactics to be realized on the ground.

TACTICS THAT ACHIEVED GOALS

- **The smoking ceremony at Camp Sovereignty set us up and brought us together, giving us perspective and courage.**
- **Shouting at delegates and throwing eggs at them succeeded in harassing them and making it clear that they were not welcome.**
- **Breaking down the fence at the back of the venue**
- **Closing DFO and disrupting Crown Casino**
- **Blowing bubbles and dancing in front of police lines created an excellent counter narrative to the media's portrayal of protesters and created strong anti-cop imagery which was widely shared on social media.**
- **Clown – suit guy was awesome, and played a useful role, pointing to the police who were raising guns**
- **Disruption and/or closing of significant roads and intersections including Wurundjeri way occupation, a priority intersection**

MISSING TACTICS

Family friendly events and **sharing information to schools,** especially considering the influence of the Weapons industry in educational institutions

More spontaneous and autonomous actions offsite, using the distraction to target complicit companies

One tactic that was discussed amply but could not be implemented was **the infiltration and disruption of the inside of the conference.** This was thwarted by many reasons but overall it pointed us to the need for more planning and upskilling and the creation of specialized affinity groups.

DECISION MAKING

Can people self-organise effectively? That is the most important question to come out of this mobilisation.

We heavily depended on affinity groups and grassroots orgs to self organise. However, **what we failed to recognise was that self-organising and autonomous action is a skill we should treat with respect and build up to it.** When you suddenly inflate the size of the action to a few thousand, you're suddenly majority newbies.

In the lead up, there were **concerns raised about decision making and the lack of a proper process** by younger POC organisers, these concerns were mostly ignored with excuses such as *"this is how we've done it in the past"* or *"it's too late in the game to change this"*. This meant that throughout the mobilisation, and most clearly on the first day, **most felt a need for more leadership and guidance.** This was because younger organisers were not empowered or supported to take decisions, as there was no process for quick decision making and people were afraid of putting others at risk, which inadvertently put everyone at risk. This also meant that the loudest voices (and those with megaphones) called the shots.

There is a question - tension - about authority. We need to consider what happens if someone sees a real opportunity - how do they build the authority to move a part of the crowd . **This can be addressed by practising moving in a group and training in the leadup, as well as building connections and networks organically so that people trust you and follow you.**

There is no recipe to this - people who are well-trusted and respected in their communities do not require such an authority - they act.

CARE TEAM

The Care team started mobilising about two months out from DLF. A few meetings determined that **the priorities were organising cop-shop pick-ups and on-the-ground care.**

On-the-ground support was well-received, with our **supplies of snacks, water, fidget toys, chargers and masks** always used by the end of action. This work is more than just providing refreshments - **it sends a powerful message about who we are as organisers and community members,** with one care team member reflecting that *"I didnt really process what was happening emotionally at the time, but reflecting later it was very powerful to have been standing in front of police lines handing out snacks and water, and making sure everyone had the watch house number. It felt like it sent a strong message to the police as well as providing community care."*

Many arrested people expressed how **valuable it was to have a friendly face waiting for them after their release.** Alongside friends and comrades we were able to help create a staunch community outside the cop shop with snacks and other recently released people to provide reassurance and much-needed refreshment.

The Care team also acted as independent persons for under 18s when arrested, meaning we could sit in on interviews with police to ensure that minors understood the questions and their rights. Under 18s told us of the immense relief to see a friendly face while in custody and have brief conversations and support in a traumatic environment.

A lot of work was put into the communication infrastructure between the Care team, medics, and the legal team, which meant we were easily able to get medical support to arrested comrades when needed, and get people in touch with lawyers and support groups. This system functioned really well as each team knew their responsibilities, and trusted other team members to communicate and fulfil their jobs.

In future care team could potentially set up **“a sort of mobile safe zone,** for actions where we hopefully are better able to hold space for longer” with “**privacy screens so black block people at the front lines** can eat and drink water without being identified”.

Additionally, we had limited capacity. Many activists experienced in Care had experienced burnout, so we were a small team. Alongside some limited communication with organisers, this meant that the Care team couldn’t provide as much support as we would have liked - including extensive following up with people after police violence. **This could be improved with greater awareness about the role of the care team, as well as greater outreach to members of the activist community who wish to be involved in a lower-risk role.**

Another drawback was not knowing where the onsite processing facility was for arrests. This meant we missed supporting many of our comrades who were taken here to be processed - both for immediate support with snacks and for lifts home. In the weeks following we have tried to make contact with everyone who wants/ needs community and legal support and there is a staunch group of comrades supporting each other through the violent and drawn out court system.

Overall, the Care team is proud to have been able to show that one of our primary principles is our deep commitment to supporting, replenishing, and keeping each other cared for.

IDEAS FOR NEXT TIME

ORGANISE A DAY FESTIVAL OR GIGS OF POPULAR BANDS TO RAISE AWARENESS AND FUNDRAISE

SIT INS OR DIE INS SO THE GENERAL PUBLIC KNOWS ABOUT IT

THINK CREATIVELY ABOUT OTHER WAYS OF INFILTRATING (MEDIA, STALLS, VENUE STAFF ETC)

DISRUPT OTHER CENTRAL AND COMMERCE POINTS OF THE CITY(TRAIN STATION, KEY INTERSECTIONS ETC)

ACTIONS FURTHER FROM MAIN SITE, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE DRAIN OF POLICE RESOURCES AND MEDIA ATTENTION



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A FINAL MESSAGE FROM POC ORGANISERS

We felt the need to write this zine as other reports on this campaign were written and edited by white organisers. We thought these reports were missing integral aspects of critique.

The final comment we want to make is that people, especially **white people, in the westernized sense of the world, have a "service" mentality.**

They want to come to a mobilisation where there is a *printed* program with designated spaces, food, marshals, medics, legal observers, media and care teams all ready for them to partake in an action.

They claim that organisers have *"a responsibility to attendees to organise in a way that doesn't escalate risks and violence, especially without strategic benefit."* They also expect everything to be non controversial or sanitized according to their individual political correctness.

There is not enough planning and strategising in the world that would guarantee the absence of violence. You are resisting the state, and you will face increased levels of violence because democracy does not exist in this place.

Protests are not festivals, they're not a service provided to you magically by a group of unknown people. **It is all we have to resist the state and fight for a better future, and it is your space to take part in.** If you see something isn't working, step in and fix the damn thing. Protest organisers are not service providers, they're not an NGO.

Demanding and expecting this and more just shows how white privilege is embedded in our system, even for so called "leftists".

Kill the white liberal in your head.